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 Uniwersytet Jagielloriski
 THE OAS, DEMOCRATIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY
 INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS1
 Celem artykulu jest przedstawienie roli Organizacji Paristw Amerykariskich
 (OPA) w procesach demokratyzacji oraz wielostronnych dzialari paristw ame
 rykariskich maj^cych na celu promocji i umacnianie wartosci demokratycznych
 w regionie zachodniej hemisfery. Od samego pocztpku swojego istnienia OPA
 aspirowala do roli promotora demokracji wsrod paristw zachodniej polkuli.
 W okresie swego funkcjonowania organizacja ta przyjita wiele deklaracji i rezolu
 cji potwierdzaj^cych ch^c szerzenia wartos'ci demokratycznych. Autor wykazuje,
 iz w okresie zimnej wojny hash) demokratyzacji stalo sii jednak bardziej instru
 mentem polityki zagranicznej Stanow Zjednoczonych niz rzeczywistym dziala
 niem OPA na rzecz tworzenia demokratycznych systemow w regionie Ameryki
 taciriskiej. W okresie 1948, a wi^c od czasu ustanowienia OPA az do roku 1989
 i korica zimnej wojny, w regionie tym mialo miejsce jedynie klika transformacji
 demokratycznych. Ta sytuacja zmienila sic; wraz z koricem rywalizacji Wschod
 -Zachod. Kraje Ameryki taciriskiej masowo decydowaly sii wtedy na demokra
 tyzacji swoich systemow politycznych. Tym razem aktywn^ roli odegraly w tym
 procesie rowniez Stany Zjednoczone. Swoja dzialalnosc na rzecz szerzenia idei
 demokratycznych zwiikszyla rowniez OPA. Jednoczes'nie w latach 90. XX w.
 w zachodniej hemisferze pojawilo sii nowe forum chc^ce odgrywac aktywn^ roli
 w procesie promocji i umacniania demokracji w tym regionie. Forum tym stal
 sii proces Szczytow Ameryk, ktory w przyszlos'ci ma doprowadzic do powstania
 Strefy Wolnego Handlu Obu Ameryk (FTAA/ALCA). Artykul jest prob^ przed
 stawienia problemu demokratyzacji jako jednego z celow procesu Szczytow Ame
 ryk. Bez w^tpienia, jesli te dwa organizmy chc% zrealizowac swoj wspolny eel, ja
 The paper was presented during the XII Congress of FIEALC, September 27-30, 2005 in Roma.
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 kim jest konsolidacja demokracji w regionie latynoamerykańskim, muszą one ze
 sobą ściśle współpracować.
 AIL ofthe countries of the Americas seek
 to consolidate democracy and defend human rights;
 we coïncide in the need ofto strengthen
 ourparticipation in world markets through
 open trade and global investments;
 we seek to improve social equity andpromote equality
 ofopportunities as necessary condition for
 the development and stability of our continent;
 we seek to cooperate to improve living standards
 and the quality ofthe environment
 in which we live; we are concerned about the
 destabilizingprolifération ofdrug trafficking
 that poisons so many North and South.
 Jose Miguel Insulza
 The idea of democracy and the aim of strengthening it at the internadonal le vel is not anything new in the Western Hemisphere. As early as the Paname
 rican era, the promotion of democracy was an important part of inter-American
 relations. The emergence of totalitarian idéologies, like nazism, fascism and com
 munism, confïrmed that the realization of démocratie values cannot be only be
 archieved through the gestures of national governments; democracy must also be
 supported by the actions of the international community. That is why, with the
 beginning of the création of a new organization which assembled all the American
 republics after World War II, it seemed to be natural that one of its principial goals
 should be to support the démocratie Systems of the member states. The expression
 of that tendency were the statements of the Charter of the Organization of Ameri
 can States (OAS). At the very beginning the Signatories expressed their conviction
 that "représentative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace
 and development of the region". Second among the stated aims of the new organi
 zation was the consolidation and promotion of représentative democracy with due
 respect for the principle of non-intervention2. The establishment of the principle
 that democracy should be supported and strengthened, which is contained in the
 Charter of the OAS, was a kind of a turning point. Until this moment the American
 countries were supporting democracy only by proclaiming déclarations; meanwhile
 The Charter ofthe Organization of American States, Bogota, April 30, 1948 [online:] www.oas.org/
 main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.htm.l
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 the Charter of the OAS created a normative precedent which galvanized states in
 Latin America.
 However, the inscription of the promotion and consolidation of democracy in
 the Charter did not prevent the appearance of new authoritarian régimes in Latin
 America. The slogan of democratization became an effective instrument of Ameri
 can foreign policy. However, its main goal in the region was not the promotion of
 democracy but the containment of the potential spread of communism. In effect,
 it became évident that the idea of democracy is extremely difficult to realize in the
 framework of the inter-American system. Authoritarian and military dictatorships in
 Τ di-ίη A mûrira «/ργρ nnf vprv infprpçfprl in rpęnprfino- civil lihcrfipę anrl rlcmncriifir
 rules. The arguments were always the same: spécifie conditions of national develop
 ment and the necessity of the maintenance of national order. Also, Latin American
 dictatorships declared that, because of the struggle against communism, there had to
 be a "temporary" restriction of the civil liberties. Thanks to the firmly anti-commu
 nist attitude of Latin American régimes, the United States had an easier task in the
 struggle with communism. In effect, the United States usually decided to support
 authoritarian governments in spite of their open contradiction of the U.S. slogan of
 democratization. Very quickly, this situation caused the réduction of the conception
 of democracy to the struggle with communist ideology. As a result, in the 1940's and
 1950's the idea of democratization stepped aside. During the years 1948-1954 in
 many countries of Latin America authoritarian régimes gained the power.
 Despite of these very unfavorable conditions, discussions within the OAS about
 supporting démocratie Systems were still présent. A decade after the Bogota confé
 rence, the Fifth Consultative Meeting of Foreign Relations Ministers was held in
 Santiago de Chile in August 1959. That meeting produced a list of spécifie attribu
 tes ot représentative democracy. 1 ne inter-rtmerican commission on numan ivigncs
 was created and the Inter-American Juridical Commission was given the responsi
 bility for drafting a convention on human rights that would consider the légal rela
 tionship between respect for human rights and the effective exercise of représenta
 tive democracy. The committee was also asked to préparé a draft convention on the
 "Effective Exercise of Représentative Democracy". Furthermore, the meeting made
 unmistakably clear, in the Déclaration of Santiago, that "the existence of antidemo
 cratic régimes is a violation of the principles on which the OAS is founded and [is]
 a danger to peace and unity of the Hemisphere'M.
 Notwithstanding this important achievement, authoritarian régimes still domi
 nated in Latin America and démocratie forces could not count on any support from
 outside. The United States was still guided predominantly by the containment poli
 cy, and used democracy only as an instrument in the struggle with any leftist move
 ments. In this situation, the OAS, with its ambitions of promoting democracy, fell
 into some kind of stagnation. The Organization used to send missions to observe
 3 Heraldo Munoz, 'The Right to Democracy in the Americas', The Journal of Interamerican Studies
 and World Ajfairs, Vol. 40, Spring 1998.
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 élections in Latin American countries, but these missions never criticized any go
 vernment or condemned fraud. In effect, the in ter-American system found itself in
 a deep crisis. As the OAS was put to the test on successive occasions and over a wider
 range of issues, it systematically demonstrated its incapacity to live up to the values
 enshrined in its Charter. Examples abound of how the inter-American system came
 to be seen as lacking of force. The Malvinas war, the confrontation in Central Ame
 rica, the Panamanian crisis, and the économie crisis of the 1980's were but a few of
 the dilemmas the OAS was incapable of handling4.
 The breakthrough came in the 1980's. Its first symptom was the protocol of Car
 tagena de Indias, approved at the I4th Spécial Session of the OAS in December 1985.
 The Protocol praised the Organization's obligations to advance democracy to an
 explicit purpose. This document amended the OAS Charter to add a new provision
 under Article 2 of chapter 1, "Nature and Purposes". The Charter henceforth, ensh
 rined the régional obligation to promote and consolidate représentative democracy,
 with due respect for the principle of non-intervention5.
 After the end of the East-West confrontation, there appeared conditions at the
 global international relations to the fundamental rebuilding of the inter-American
 system. Since the beginning of the 1990's, the OAS and other organizations and in
 stitutions which cooperated with it, engaged in actions which were designed to sup
 port democracv and promote respect for human riehts and inteerated develooment
 in Latin America and the Caribbean. In October 1990, the Unit for the Promotion
 of Democracy (UPD) was created after a motion proposed by Canada was ratified.
 Among the goals of the Unit were the establishment of consultative services and di
 rect technical help for the member states during the process of the strengthening of
 political institutions and démocratie procédures6. The next important step appeared
 to De tne zi*' session ot tne General Assembly oi the tJAS on June iyil, in San
 tiago de Chile. The members adopted there two fondamental documents: the first
 was: The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal ofthe Inter-American
 System and the second was AG/Res. 1080, Représentative Democracy. The Santiago
 Commitment Déclaration declared an "inescapable commitment to the defense and
 promotion of représentative democracy and human rights in the region"7. The short
 Resolution 1080 instructed the Secretary General to convene immediately a meeting
 of the Permanent Council in the event of any occurrences giving use to the sudden
 or irregular interruption of a démocratie political and institutional process or of the
 legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government of a member
 4 Carlos Andres Peres, 'The OAS Opportunities', Foreign Policy, Fali 1990.
 5 Andrew F. Cooper, Thomas Legler: 'The OAS Démocratie Solidarity Paradigm', Latin American
 Politics and Society, Vol. 43, Spring 2001.
 6 Wiesław Dobrzycki, System międzyamerykański, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2002,
 s. 170.
 7 The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, Santiago
 de Chile, June 4, 1991; [online:] www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.
 org/OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.
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 state. The Permanent Council would then décidé to convene a Meeting of Foreign
 Ministers to décidé on the appropriate collective response8.
 Together with the adoption of those two documents, the activity of the OAS for
 the promotion and supporting democracy visibly increased. In December 1991, in
 Washington, the General Assembly of the OAS agreed to amend the Charter and
 insert a new article — Article 9. This amendment stated that "the member of the
 OAS whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force
 may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in the sessions of the
 General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization
 and the Specialized Conférences as well as in the commissions, working groups, and
 any other bodies established"9. In practice, the Protocol of Washington allows the
 suspension of antidemocratic member governments.
 Ail those initiatives created in the framework of the inter-American system were
 the effect of the events which took place in Latin America since the 1980's. During
 that decade the western hemisphere made a significant turn towards democracy. The
 beginning of that process occurred when Raul Alfonsin won the presidential élection
 and ended the military dictatorship in Argentina. In the following years démocratie
 governments were established, among others, in: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
 Venezuela. Democratization of the political Systems was accompanied by the ope
 ning ot the tree marked economy. t5y the end ot the l^SUs, the development strate
 gy supported by protectionism was jettisoned in almost the whole of Latin America.
 A change in the U.S. Latin American policy played an important role in this process.
 It took some time for the United States to recognize and to understand the advan
 tages of a foreign policy based on the support of democracy. The issue has a long
 history in American foreign policy, relating to the old debate between "realists" and
 "idealists". Realists believed that the United States should be concerned above all
 with defending its national self-interest, regardless of whom it resulted in being allied
 with. Idealists, in contrast, wanted a foreign policy imbued with morality and ethical
 purpose; they wanted the United States to be a "beacon on a hill" standing for demo
 cracy, human rights, and social justice, regardless of whom that resulted in insulting.
 The realist school was summed up, briefly if crudely, in the words of John F. Dulles,
 who once proclaimed that in the world "we have no friends, only interests"; the ide
 alist school was to be found in Woodrow Wilson's vow to "make the world safe for
 democracy"10. The four years term of George Bush (1989-1993) resulted in the re
 vision of the Latin American policy of the White House. At that time, Washington
 embarked on the regionalism and partnership in the relations with Latin America.
 The new treatment was visible, for example, in the secretary of state, James Bakers
 AG/Res. 1080 "Représentative Democracy ", Santiago de Chile, June 5, 1991; [online:] www.oas.org/
 XXXIIGA/english/docs_en/Representative_Democracy.htm.
 The Washington Protocol, Washington, December 14, 1992; [online:] www.upd.oas.org/lab/Docu
 ments/excecutive_orders/ eo_washington_protocol_92_eng.pdf.
 Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy Toward Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. Issues and
 Controversies from Reagan to Bush, New York University Press, New York/London, 1992, s. 313.
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 speeches. He proposed to the western hemispheric countries a new partnership sup
 ported on the respect and joint responsibility. According to him, the inter-American
 dialogue should be concentrated on issues like: democratization, économie develop
 ment, fighting with narcobusiness, debt, commerce, migrations, the natural environ
 ment and prolifération of nuclear weapons.
 Although, the triumph of democracy in the majority of the Latin American coun
 tries did not mean that there is no danger for new democracies. Only few weeks sińce
 the adoption of important resolutions in Santiago de Chile, the Organization had to
 stand up for defense of democracy in Haiti. On December 1991, the democratically
 elected président of Haiti - Jean Bertrand Aristide - was overthrown. Thanks to the
 newly adopted mechanisms the OAS immediately undertook the action. The first
 step was the condemnation of the coup and the çonvening of an ad hoc meeting of
 foreign ministers. In effect, the spécial commission was established. The commission
 was sent to the island to negotiate the restoration of Aristide. The goal appeared to be
 very difficult. It was possible only when the OAS cooperated with the United Nations
 and when the Security Council announced sanctions against the new government.
 Finally, the legally elected président and démocratie order were restored after the mili
 tary intervention of the United States in September 1994. It is worth underlining the
 fact that the intervention was made under the authority of the OAS and the UN.
 X11V k'uiiuugu Iitvviiailidiil >ταϋ avuiaivu «. JVWXIU L1X11V, vy 11 V ΧψΙΙΙ i y YVIIW11
 mocratically elected président Alberto Fujimori of Peru illegally closed his nations
 congress, usurped judicial power, arrested several members of congress and political
 leaders and suspended many civil rights. A few days later, the foreign ministers met
 and "profoundly deplored" Fujimori's actions and demanded the restoration of de
 mocracy in Peru. The ministers also appointed a spécial diplomatie mission to tra
 vel to Peru to promote negotiations between the opposition and the government
 for the restoration of democracy. Some countries, among them the United States,
 eut économie aid to Peru. Founded on the principle of démocratie governance, the
 Rio Group suspended Peru from attendine its meeting. In this conrexr. the arrivai
 of président Fujimori to Nassau in May 1992 to attend the meeting of OAS foreign
 ministers was completely unexpected. During this meeting Peru's président promised
 to restore democracy in his country through a process that would culminate in the
 élection of démocratie Constitutional Congress. The élections were held in Novem
 ber 1992, under OAS scrutiny11.
 The OAS has invoked Resolution 1080 again in the cases of Guatemala and
 Paraguay. The case of Paraguay was spécifie one because there was not a coup. On
 April 22, 1996, président Juan Carlos Wasmosy fired the army commander generał
 Lino Oviedo, but Oviedo refused to resign unless the président also left the office.
 The Brazilian and Argentine, and the U.S. government actively discouraged Wasmo
 sy from resign, and many international leaders, including OAS Secretary General
 came to his defense together with civil society of Paraguay. The OAS, as an institu
 Heraldo Munoz, 'The Right to Democracy in the Americas'...
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 tion did not play a direct role, but Paraguay maintained its fragile grip on democracy
 for a couple of years, in which time the country went through another set of political
 crises. These were also handled in an ad hoc fashion with the help of the diplomats
 from neighboring democracies12.
 Ali these events confirmed that the mechanisms of defense and consolidation of
 démocratie Systems worked out by the Organization are quite effective. Additionally,
 the OAS believed that it can play an important role in the democratization process.
 Aithough, together with the deepening of democracy, the transition to the free market
 economy proceeded. The économie transition in Latin America took place under very
 difficult circumstances. However, as early as in 1991, most of Latin American coun
 tries had new free market économies. As a resuit of those changes George Bush's admi
 nistration sought to build a new relationship with Latin America based on consensus
 and coopération in order to résolve problems affecting the Americas. Those tendencies
 could be observed in relations between the U.S. and Mexico and the process leading to
 the création of the North American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA).
 However, it was Bill Clinton, the first post-Cold War président of the United
 States, who was entrusted with the task of implementing those new ideas. On ar
 riving in office, Clinton had limited experience of international affairs. In its Latin
 American policy Washington had to concentrate on two main issues: the passage of
 NAFTA and resolving the Haitian dilemma. Generally, the Clinton administration
 was not very interested in Latin American affairs. However, the successful ratification
 debate over NAFTA allowed Président Clinton to come up with the idea of a trade
 bloc stretching from Alaska to Patagonia. The new proposai referred to Bush's Ini
 tiative for the Americas. Clinton's initiative was the result of growing awareness of
 the increasing significance of the Latin American region for the U.S. economy. Also,
 the timing of the présentation of the idea at the Summit of the Americas in Miami
 in December 1994 was no coïncidence. Authoritarian régimes, in the majority of
 countries, had been already overthrown and replaced by démocratie governments
 led by political leaders who would guarantee their commitment to the implementa
 tion of both political as well as économie reforms. Every country in South America
 nad made a great deal ot progress toward democracy, a tact that carried signiticant
 geopolitical implications. Even though Brazil and Argentina had been rivais almost
 sińce their independence, their civilian présidents realized that if they fail to coope
 rate with one another, only their respective militaries would beneftt. These two So
 uth American states ended their nuclear weapons programs, reduced their defense
 expenditures, and joined with Uruguay and Paraguay in 1991 to establish a common
 market arrangement termed Mercosur13. Many countries had managed to end their
 local guérilla wars and to overcome the crisis of the 1980's.
 12 Robert A. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool. U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean,
 Westview Press, Boulder, 2001, p. 302.
 13 Idem, 'The Clinton Administration and the Americas: the Postwar, Rhytm'n'Blues' Journal oflnter
 -American Studies and World Aff"airs, Vol. 38, Winter 1996/1997.
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 However, the Clinton's proposai was met with a mixed réception. It was favored
 by some countries like Colombia and Venezuela, although, the biggest économies
 had some serious réservations. Argentina was putting forward demands to eliminate
 subsidies for US farmers. Brazil's president-elect Henrique Cardoso stated that Bra
 zil's intégration with Common Market of the Southern Cone (El Mercado Comiin
 - Mercosour) was considered to be his government's priority, whereas Mexico didn't
 want to share its benefits from NAFTA with other countries14.
 Finally, thirty-four leaders of Western Hemispheric countries met in Miami in
 December 9-11, 1994. The most important effect of the meeting was the adoption
 υι mc uucuiiiciu lilicu: LJCLuiraiiun uj rrincipie*. rurintnmp jur isevetopmem ana
 Prosperity: Democracy, Free Trade and Sustainable Development in the Americas. In the
 introduction the authors stated that „for the first time in history, the Americas are
 a community of démocratie nations". The first part of the Déclaration emphasized
 that représentative democracy is indispensable for the stability and development of
 the region. The Signatories reaffirmed that they will work through the appropriate
 bodies of the OAS to strengthen démocratie institutions and to promote and defend
 their constitutional role, in accordance with the OAS Charter. Also, they endorsed
 the OAS efforts to enhance peace and démocratie, social and économie stability in
 the region15.
 In this way, a new forum was created, and one of its most important goals was
 the protection of democracy. While the OAS, and especially its Permanent Council,
 remained on the margins of the negotiations process for the Miami Summit, the new
 mulitilateralism unleashed by the U.S. summit negotiators engaged the organization
 at the functional levels, where the OAS developed technical strengths and institu
 tional legitimacy. The evolving Plan of Action also respected the OAS's role as a ne
 gotiator and as depositary for hemispheric conventions, such as the one on human
 rights. The OAS's areas of engagement with respect to the Miami Summit were prin
 cipally "political" ones where the Organization had a long track record: democracy,
 iiuinaii ngnis anu security. nrnong rnese ponticai issues are wnat can De seen pn
 marily as "state-to-state" issues that assign heavy importance to foreign ministry ne
 gotiators and traditional diplomacy, where the OAS has had a significantly successful
 record. Nevertheless, the Miami Plan of Action assigned the OAS a paramount role
 in summit follow-up activities in a variety of summit mandates, both "technical" and
 "political". The most important areas are: strengthening democracy, promoting and
 protecting human rights, combating corruption, eliminating the threat of national
 and international terrorism, building mutual confidence, providing the technical
 support for the Free Trade Area of the Americas16.
 'Latin America? Where's that?', The Economist, December 5, 1994.
 Miami Déclaration of Principles, Summit of the Americas, Miami, December 11, 1994; source:
 http://www.summit-americas.org.
 Robin L. Rosenberg, 'The OAS and the Summit of the Americas: Coexistance', Latin American Po
 litics and Society, Vol. 43, Spring 2001.
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 The next Summit of the Americas brought further dissonance berween the OAS
 and the forum which occurred at the Summits of the Americas. With the announce
 ment that Chile would host a Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago in 1998,
 also came the décision that the agenda for the Summit would be negotiated through
 the Summit Implementation Review Group. That meant the further marginalization
 of the OAS. At the Santiago Déclaration, adopted during the Summit, the leaders of
 the western hemispheric countries stated that: "The strength and meaning of repré
 sentative democracy lie in the active participation of individuals at ail levels of civic
 life. The démocratie culture must encompass our entire population. We will streng
 then éducation for democracy and promote the necessary actions for government
 institutions to become more participatory structures"17.
 However, the turning point was the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec
 City, April 20-22, 2001. The most important resuit of this summit was the adoption
 of the Final Déclaration. The heads of states and governments acknowledged that the
 values and practices of democracy are fundamental. According to the Déclaration any
 unconstitutional change or interruption of the démocratie order in any of the states of
 the Hemisphere, constitutes an obstacle to the participation of that states government
 in the FTAA process18. Also the leaders assembled at the Third Summit obliged fore
 ign affairs ministers to préparé an Inter-American Démocratie Charter. The project
 would have been prepared during the coming General Assembly or the UAb.
 To sum up, we must agree that the Quebec City Summit did very little to advance
 the FTAA process. However, the adoption of démocratie criterion as a sine qua non
 condition of participation at the Summits of the Americas process is undoubtedly
 an important achievement. It is important to underline the fact that when it cornes
 to the issue of the protection of democracy, the participants of the Summits of the
 Americas process decided to closely cooperate with the OAS. The resuit of this co
 -operation was the adoption, just a few months later, of the Inter-American Demo
 crauc ^narter. s\i une very ucginning, in s\r ucic i, mcrc is a Mgnmeaiii suucniciii.
 "The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have
 an obligation to promote and defend it". Further, in Article 3, the Signatories men
 tion essential elements of représentative democracy. There are included: respect for
 the huma η rights and fundamental liberties, access to and the exercise of power in
 accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free élections based on the
 secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the pe
 ople, the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the séparation
 of powers and independence of branches of government19. Also, the Charter adopted
 Déclaration of Santiago de Chile, Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago de Chile, April 18,
 1998; [online:] www.summit-americas.org/chiledec.htm.
 Final Déclaration, Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, April 22, 2001; [online:] www.
 summit-americas.org.
 Inter-American Démocratie Charter, Spécial Session of General Assemblv of the OAS, Lima, Peru,
 September 11,2001; [online:] www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/
 OASpage/eng/Documents/Democractic_Charter.htm.
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 at Lima express a lot of steps which can be taken by the OAS in the aim of restoration
 of démocratie order at the member state. As rhe ultimate step the Charter expressed
 the possibility of suspending a member state from the exercise of its right to parti
 cipate in the OAS by an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states20. The
 adoption of the Inter-American Démocratie Charter was recognized as a significant
 success of the western hemispheric countries and the OAS. Also, there is significant
 evidence that in the sphere of defense of démocratie values in Latin American coun
 tries, the OAS can successfully cooperate with the Summit of the Americas process.
 Undoubtedly such coopération can bring a lot of good.
 However, as we saw in the autumn of this year, in spite of adopting the Charter
 and closer coopération between the OAS and the Summits of the Americas, the or
 ganization still is not prepared enough for resolving political crises in member states.
 The cases of Ecuador and Bolivia demonstrated the Organization's weakness and
 countries, events gained significant momentum. On April 15. Ecuador's Président
 - Lucio Gutierrez - flanked by armed forces' commanders, announced that he was
 dissolving the Suprême Court, nota bene, for the second time in four months. Also,
 he imposed a state of emergency in Quito. In défiance, several thousand protesters
 immediately took to the streets, calling for Mr Gutierrez to be sent packing too. As
 the army sat on its hand, within hours the président was forced to lift the emergen
 cy. Each day the démonstrations, led by Quito's middle class, swelled. On April 20,
 Congress heeded the clamor on the streets: 60 of its 100 members voted for a reso
 lution which accused Gutierrez of "abandoning his post" and appointed in his place
 the vice-president, Alfredo Palacio. To the end, the président insisted he would not
 step down. But the police chief resigned, saying he would not repress people. Final
 ly, the army hustled Gutierrez out of the presidential palace. He took refugee in the
 Brazilian embassy as an arrest warrant was issued against him. In this way, Gutierrez,
 who took office in January 2003, became the third président sińce 1997 to be ousted
 from power in Ecuador21.
 Very similar crisis of democracy took place in Bolivia. After weeks of road błocka
 des and sharp protests, the président, Carlos Mesa, has resigned, opening the way for
 the président of the Senate, Hormand Vaca Diez, a hate figure for agitators, to succeed
 him. Mr Vaca Diez shifted Congress from La Paz to Sucre, the seat of Suprême Court,
 but the protesters followed. It looked like Vaca Diez's accession to the presidency, mi
 ght spark a civil war. Finally, he relinquished his claim to the presidency. The next in
 line, the président of the Congress' lower house did so too. In this situation, the office
 fell to Eduardo Rodriguez, the head of the Suprême Court, who is expected to hold
 a generał élection later this year. It should produce something Bolivia badly needs:
 a government and Congress with legitimacy to résolve disputes over natural resources,
 20 Ibidem, articles 19-21.
 21 Juan Forero.'Ecuador's Leader Flees and Vice-President Replaces Him'; [online] www.nytimes.
 com/2005/04/21/international/americas/21ecuador.html; downloaded: 27.04.2005.
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 the rights of the poor, and régional autonomy. But democracy may not produce the
 outcome the protesters want. Will they hołd Bolivia hostage again22?
 These events disturbed not only a few states in the Western Hemisphere but also
 the OAS and its new elected Secretary General. The first step the Organization took
 was to send a spécial mission to Quito. But the missions task was not to find a so
 lution to the crisis but only to acquaint the OAS with the situation. In the case of
 Bolivia, the mission was not even sent. Despite the demands of Président Alejandro
 Toledo, who pointed to the statements of Inter-American Démocratie Charter, the
 Organization's activity was close to zero. In effect, it is was not particularly surpri
 sing that during the 35,h General Assembly session in Ford Lauderdale, Florida, the
 issue of democracy and the mechanisms for its defense dominated discussions. The
 most controversial issue was the proposition of the United States to establish a per
 manent committee of the OAS that would monitor the exercise of democracy in the
 hemisphere. According to the U.S. plan, the Secretary General should have greater
 competencies to préparé an action plan which would include strong mechanisms
 for implementing a Démocratie Charter23. But that proposai faced strong résistance
 from the majority of Latin American countries. Among them were Brazil and Me
 xico. They rejected Washington's proposai because according to them it would cre
 ate instruments for intervening in the internai affairs of sovereign states. They were
 afraid also rhar rhe nlan was aimed apainst Venezuela24. Finailv. a Chitean-soonsored
 resolution was embraced at the end of the OAS General Assembly, ending a bitter
 1 y divisive gathering. After heavy modifications, it became a fuzzy compromise that
 allowed ail sides to claim the victory. The Draft Déclaration of Florida entrusts the
 Secretary General with developing a draft plan of action, with a view to propose spé
 cifie measures to strengthen the effectiveness and application of the Inter-American
 Démocratie Charter in defending, protecting and promoting democracy. It also calls
 for non-governmental activist groups to be given an officiai voice in OAS délibéra
 tions on whether member nations were straying from the démocratie path. After the
 adoption of the document, there were voices of victory and a great deal of confidence
 that democracy wouid De strengtnenea. duc is it piausiDier we wm sec m me iuiure.
 At the moment it seems to be that the U.S. ambassador to the OAS, John Maisto,
 was right when he said that: "This resolution is done in the OAS style"'5. It may be
 that there are only big words and nothing else. And at the présent time, what are ne
 eded in Latin America and the Inter-American system are effective mechanisms for
 protecting and strengthening democracy.
 'Bolivia: Cooling Off', The Economist, June 18lh, 2005, p. 46.
 Hugo Alconada Mon, 'Fracaso la propuesta de EE.UU. en la OEA; [online] www.lanacion.ar/;
 downloaded: 07.06.2005.
 Idem, 'Nueva Rebelion contra EE.UU Dentro de la OEA'; [online] www.lanacion.ar/; downlo
 aded: 07.06.2005.
 Nancy San Martin, Pabo Bachalet, 'OAS ends up with Compromise on Powers to Guard Demo
 cracy'; [online] www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/americas/11839755htm; downlo
 aded: 08.06.2005.
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 To conclude, it is necessary to underline that the wave of democratization which
 started in the 1980s has finished with many successes in Latin America. Those suc
 cesses are the effect of transitions which took place at the international level and in
 inter-American relations. As the millennium ended, the people of Latin America and
 the Caribbean were building démocratie institutions abroad. They were cooperating
 with the United States while its excess more effectively. They were forging wise ru
 les to remain in force and peace, finding that they valued the procédures of liberał
 democracy and the efficiency of markets26. The décliné of East-West rivalry made
 the resolution of problems easier. The result of that was the rapprochement betwe
 en the Americas and a renaissance of inter-American relations. There occurred new
 possibilities and tasks. The OAS, free from the cold war disputes, can concentrate
 on the resolving or problems the western hemisphere and the promotion or démo
 cratie values. As was showed at the Quebec City Summit, the OAS can count in that
 area on the support of the leaders of the western hemispheric sates. However, this
 task does not belong to the easiest ones. The future of democracy and its ability to
 overcome a growing array of the changes will be partly determined by its ability both
 to devolve power beyond traditional elites and to further evolve outside traditional
 Western societies. Having already inspired the most fundamental political change of
 the twentieth-century, democracy now holds out the prospect of further innovation,
 sometimes in unfamiliar directions, as it expands in the twenty-first century27. There
 fore, the question of whether democracy has achieved complété success in the Latin
 American region is still open, and the need for consolidating and strengthening dé
 mocratie values still exists.
 Jose I. Dominguez, The Americas: Found and Then Lost Again, Foreign Policy, Fali 1998, p. 134.
 Robin Wright: "Democracy: Challenges and Innovations in the 1990's, The Washington Quartarly,
 Summer 1997, p. 34-35.
 Mgr Karol DERWICH, absolwent Instytutu Nauk Politycznych i Stosunków Mię
 dzynarodowych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego oraz Centrum Studiów Latynoamery
 kańskich Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Obecnie doktorant w Instytucie Ameryka
 nistyki i Studiów Polonijnych UJ. Zainteresowania autora związane są z regionem
 zachodniej półkuli i stosunkami międzyamerykańskimi oraz polityką zagraniczną
 Stanów Zjednoczonych. Autor artykułów na temat stosunków międzynarodowych
 w zachodniej hemisferze (m.in.: Polityka Ronalda Reagana wobec Ameryki Środkowej,
 Stosunki Meksyku z USA w latach 1910-1917 opublikowanych w kwartalniku „Ame
 ryka Łacińska"). Uczestnik konferencji międzynarodowych i ogólnopolskich o tema
 tyce amerykańskiej i latynoamerykańskiej (referat na temat From Miami to Qiiebec
 City — the Results ofthe Summits ofthe Americas przedstawiony w czasie kongresu Eu
 ropejskiej Rady do spraw Studiów Latynoamerykańskich (CEISAL) w Bratysławie,
 lipiec 2004 r.; referat na temat: An American Dream - Reality for a Few. The Cuban
 Immigration in Miami przedstawiony w czasie konferencji Polskiego Stowarzyszenia
 Studiów Amerykanistycznych w Warszawie, październik 2004 r.).
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